Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 25

Issue 2

Article 2

October 2018

Balancing the Competing Functions of Patent Post-Grant
Proceedings
Michael Xun Liu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael X. Liu, Balancing the Competing Functions of Patent Post-Grant Proceedings, 25 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 157 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Liu: Balancing the Competing Functions of Patent Post-Grant Proceeding
LIU ARTICLE _COMPLETE (2) (DO NOT DELETE)

10/2/2018 1:44 PM

ARTICLE

BALANCING THE COMPETING FUNCTIONS OF
PATENT POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS
Michael Xun Liu*
Since the 1980s, the United States Patent and Trademark Office has amended or revoked
patents through post-grant proceedings. These are quasi-judicial proceedings that are often used
to resolve patent disputes. But aside from adjudicating private disputes, post-grant proceedings
also aim to protect the public against invalid patents, create more certainty in patent rights, and
bolster confidence in the patent system. These functions are often described as “examinational”
because they rely on the PTO’s ability to reexamine the validity of issued patents.
This Article explores the extent to which post-grant proceedings under the America Invents
Act (AIA) perform examinational functions. Although post-grant proceedings have proven
effective at adjudicating patent validity during litigation, they have been less effective at fulfilling
their examinational functions. In particular, several provisions of the AIA undermine the
patent office’s ability to protect the public from invalid patents, while others discourage early
resolution of patent validity and scope. To assess the potential benefits and drawbacks of reform,
this Article also looks at the European Patent Office’s experience with post-grant proceedings.
Despite their problems, European proceedings have been fairly successful at screening patents
and improving patent quality. As such, they may offer useful insights for the U.S. patent
system.

*J.D.

2014, University of Michigan Law School. The views expressed in this Article are the
author’s alone, and do not represent the views of any private or government institutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During Supreme Court arguments in Oil States Energy Services v. Green’s Energy
Group, Chief Justice Roberts asked whether counsel believed that “[i]f you want
the sweet of having a patent, you’ve got to take the bitter that the government
might reevaluate it at some subsequent point.”1 Setting aside any constitutional
problems with this logic, it seems reasonable to assume that if the Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”) decides whether to grant patents, then the agency
should also correct its own mistakes by amending or revoking improperly issued
patents. Nevertheless, the task of reviewing issued patents has been traditionally
left to district courts, and the PTO has only been able to revoke improperly
granted patents through post-grant proceedings in the past few decades.2 How
the PTO conducts post-grant proceedings, and whether its procedures are
consistent with underlying policy goals, remains a contentious topic.
Since the America Invents Act (AIA) became law, the PTO’s Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (Board) has started playing a much larger role in reevaluating
patents.3 Through AIA Reviews, the Board now decides validity in a significant
number of patent disputes, thus taking on a task that was previously reserved
almost exclusively for district courts.4 Viewing post-grant proceedings as only a
substitute for litigation, however, overlooks important policy goals. Unlike
district court litigation, post-grant proceedings should do more than adjudicate
private disputes—they are also intended to protect the public from overbroad
patents and promote certainty in patent rights.5 These functions have been
described as “examinational” because they rely on the PTO’s ability to reexamine
the validity of issued patents.6 Substantively and procedurally, there are
differences between an adjudicative proceeding and one that is more
examinational. For example, a proceeding that protects the public from
overbroad patents should give the PTO wide discretion to revoke patents that

1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, Oil States Energy Serv., LLC v. Green’s Energy Grp.,
LLC, No. 16-712 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/2017/16-712_879d.pdf.
2 Kenneth R. Adamo, Patent Reexamination, 58 CHI. KENT L. REV. 59, 59 (1981).
3 The AIA created three types of post-grant proceedings: post-grant review, inter partes
review, and covered business method review. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). This Article refers to them collectively as AIA Reviews.
4 By the end of 2017, the PTO received over 7,900 petitions for AIA reviews, 1912 of
which have reached a decision on the merits. PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD, TRIAL
STATISTICS 11 (Dec. 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_
Statistics_2017-12-31.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2018) [hereinafter 2017 TRIAL STATISTICS].
5 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016).
6 Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

3

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2
LIU ARTICLE _COMPLETE (2) (DO NOT DELETE)

160

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

10/2/2018 1:44 PM

[Vol. 25:2

were improperly granted.7 By contrast, a proceeding that is solely adjudicative is
more likely to limit PTO’s role to assessing the parties’ arguments, much like a
district court judge or jury.8
Compared to pre-AIA proceedings like ex parte reexaminations, AIA Reviews
are meant to be more adjudicative than examinational.9 Arguments are made to
a panel of administrative patent judges instead of patent examiners, and the
proceedings allow for limited discovery and an oral hearing.10 In other respects,
however, AIA Reviews remain somewhat examinational. For example, the PTO
does not give a presumption of validity for challenged claims.11 And “[p]arties
that initiate the proceeding need not have a concrete stake in the outcome;
indeed, they may lack constitutional standing.”12 Because of these mixed
characteristics, AIA Reviews are typically described as “hybrid” proceedings with
both adjudicative and examinational elements.13
Whether AIA Reviews actually achieve the policy goals of a “hybrid”
proceeding, however, remains debatable. In theory, AIA Reviews advance policy
goals consistent with patent examination, such as protecting the public from
overbroad claims and promoting certainty in patent rights.14 But in practice, the
Board’s role in AIA Reviews tends to be more limited.15 The Board does not
independently evaluate validity, and relies almost exclusively on the parties’
arguments.16 Although patent owners have the right to amend their claims, few
succeeded in doing so within the first few years of the AIA.17 So instead of
narrowing claims to keep “patent monopolies . . . within their legitimate
scope,”18 the Board’s decision is usually limited to affirming or invalidating
challenged patents, just like district court decisions. Moreover, the majority of
AIA Reviews are conducted alongside litigation involving the same patents, and
the district court proceedings are often stayed pending the Board’s decision.19
7 Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward A Viable Administrative Revocation System for
U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13–14 (1997).
8 Id. at 36.
9 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144.
10 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 316.
11 35 U.S.C. § 316 (establishing preponderance of the evidence standard for invalidity).
12 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 See infra Part III.A.
16 Id.
17 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
MOTION TO AMEND STUDY 4 (Apr. 30, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/2016-04-30%20P.T.A.B.%20MTA%20study.pdf.
18 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2134-2144.
19 Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court
Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 69 (2016) (“[A]bout 86.8 % of IPR or CBM challenged
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Therefore, one commonly held view is that AIA Reviews essentially supplant
district court validity litigation with an administrative proceeding that is more
favorable to challengers.20
Accordingly, the reality of AIA Reviews can seem inconsistent with its policy
goals. This Article examines the source of this disconnect, and identifies two
issues that undermine the examinational function of AIA Reviews. First, the
Board’s ability to independently evaluate patentability is limited, so it relies
almost exclusively on the petitioners’ arguments to revoke claims.21 From the
standpoint of protecting the public against invalid patents, this becomes
problematic if the patentee settles with the petitioner or amends the claims in a
way that eliminates the risk of infringement for the petitioner. In these
circumstances, the petitioner may not have any reason to argue for invalidity.
This issue was partly why the PTO initially decided to require patent owners to
prove the patentability of proposed amended claims in AIA Reviews.22 By doing
so, the Board tried to protect the public from invalid patents by forcing patent
owners to show that its new claims are patentable, since the Board cannot
examine the claims itself.23
Second, the AIA’s estoppel rules discourage early resolution of patent
validity. Post-grant proceedings were created in part because improperly granted
patents have negative social and economic consequences even if they are not
litigated.24 Thus, it was important to provide a means of challenging invalid
patents before they are asserted in court.25 Likewise, early resolution of validity
is also beneficial because that is “when patent holders have invested the least
resources and the opportunity for third parties to change course in the market is

patents are also being litigated in the federal courts.”); Andrew J. Gray & Ehsun Forghany,
Avoiding a Patent War on Two Fronts, in 2017 PTAB DIGEST: THE LATEST TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS IN POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS 26 (2017), https://www.morganlewis.com//media/files/publication/report/ptab-post-grant-proceedings_fin_screen.ashx.
20 Peter J. Pitts, ‘Patent Death Squads’ vs. Innovation, WALL STR. J. (June 10, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/patent-death-squads-vs-innovation1433978591?mg=prod/accounts-wsj; Stacy Lewis & Tom Irving, Very Few Appreciated Just How
Bad AIA Inter Partes Reviews (IPRs) Would Be for Patent Owners, Although IPR Denials Have Been,
for Patent Owners, A Glimmer of Hope, 11 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 28, 36 (2015).
21 Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 18750, 18754 (Apr. 1, 2016) (Final Rule) [hereinafter 2016 Rule
Amendments].
22 Id. (explaining how “the Office has set forth rules for motions to amend that account for
the absence of an independent examination by the Office”).
23 Id.
24 Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 101, 104 (2006); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV.
613, 620 (2015).
25 Leslie, supra note 24; Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24.
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greatest.”26 The AIA, however, does little to encourage early challenges to patent
validity. Instead, the statute imposes broad estoppel for post-grant review
(“PGR”) petitions, which pushes parties to wait and challenge validity through
IPR, and often only after litigation becomes imminent.27 So even though an
important advantage of post-grant proceedings is the ability to resolve patent
rights before litigation, the reality is that most AIA Reviews are directed to
patents that are being adjudicated in district court anyways.28
The U.S. patent system is not alone in trying to balance competing policy
visions of post-grant proceedings. Like the PTO, the European Patent Office
(“EPO”) also provides a “first window” to challenge the validity of recently
issued patents.29 Since the 1980s, third-parties in Europe could file an opposition
proceeding to challenge patent validity within nine-months of issuance.30 These
proceedings have their own problems, including their tendency to drag on for
years.31 Nevertheless, EPO opposition proceedings provide a useful contrast
with AIA Reviews. Around five percent of all European Patents are opposed,
and this procedure has become an important tool for challenging validity,
particularly with respect to economically important patents. 32 Although it is
neither feasible nor desirable to make AIA Reviews the same as EPO
oppositions, the PTO could adopt certain features like narrowing estoppel for
PGR to encourage earlier challenges to patent validity, and giving the PTO more
authority to independently examine claims, at least in PGR. Doing so should
allow the PTO to better carry out the examinational functions of AIA Reviews.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Section I reviews the adjudicative and
examinational aspects of post-grant proceedings, and describes how such
proceedings have evolved in the U.S. Section II looks at how certain features of
the AIA undermines its examinational function. It explores why the PTO is
constrained to the petitioner’s invalidity arguments and how, in some
circumstances, this limitation can undermine the policy goals of AIA Reviews.
This section also looks at how the AIA’s estoppel rules effectively discourage
26 Stephen G. Kunin & Anton W. Fetting, The Metamorphosis of Inter Partes Reexamination, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 976 (2004).
27 See infra Part III.B.
28 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69.
29 Filip De Corte et al., AIA Post-Grant Review & European Oppositions: Will They Work in
Tandem, or Rather Pass Like Ships in the Night?, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 93, 98–112 (2012).
30 Id.
31 Jonathan Radcliffe, The European Patent Office Introduces a “Go-Faster” Opposition
Process, Reed Smith LLP (June 21, 2016), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/
2016/06/the-european-patent-office-introduces-a-gofaster-o.
32 Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System-Design
Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1006 (2004); Stuart Graham et al.,
Post-Issue Patent Quality Control: A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-Examinations and European
Patent Oppositions, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8807, 2002).
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petitions within the nine-month “first window” period for PGR. Section III
compares AIA Reviews to the EPO’s opposition proceedings. Although
opposition proceedings may seem similar to PGR, the former is generally
considered more effective at screening out dubious patents early.33 Accordingly,
this section examines whether the PTO should emulate certain features of
opposition proceedings.
II. COMPETING FUNCTIONS OF POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS
Broadly speaking, allowing the PTO to revoke or amend issued patents serves
two purposes.34 The first is to fix defects in the PTO’s original examination, and
is often described as “examinational” or “curative.”35 At its core, this aspect of
post-grant proceedings aims to protect the public from overbroad or invalid
patents, which can skew market competition and deter innovation.36 In theory,
giving the PTO a chance to correct its errors also bolsters certainty in patent
rights and the presumption of validity generally.37 The second function is to
provide an alternative to district court validity litigation. Instead of trying to fix
or improve patents for the public benefit, this aspect of administrative patent
review tries to resolve disputes between private parties more efficiently and
accurately.38
The legal literature has long recognized these two functions of post-grant
proceedings. For instance, Professor Mark Janis describes how administrative
review could be a curative mechanism “through which the public could compel
the PTO to correct its own errors, even in the absence of any infringement
proceedings.”39 Not only would this eliminate bad patents, but “courts reviewing
those same patents in the course of infringement litigation would have greater
assurance that the PTO had conducted a proper prior art search and had applied
the results of that search thoughtfully.”40 Professor Janis distinguished this
aspect of administrative review from “litigation avoidance,” which aimed to
“provide a specialized tribunal to resolve disputes in lieu of traditional court
adjudication.”41
The distinction between the examinational and adjudicative aspects of postgrant proceedings also has practical consequences. For example, restricting
See infra Part IV.
Janis, supra note 7, at 23.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 481, 483–84 (2000).
39 Janis, supra note 7, at 13–14.
40 Id. at 15.
41 Id. at 36.
33
34
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invalidity arguments to those based on documentary prior art would “seem
inconsistent with the goal of formulating an administrative alternative to validity
litigation” but “fully consistent with the goal of providing a curative
mechanism.”42 Accused infringers in district court litigation can conduct wideranging discovery into prior commercial sales or public use of the patented
invention to invalidate a patent.43 By contrast, patent examiners cannot
“thoroughly investigate sources of nondocumentary prior art, such as public uses
and offers for sale. Thus, original examinations are often de facto limited to
documentary sources of prior art.”44 So to the extent that post-grant proceedings
are a redo of the initial examination instead of an alternative to litigation, it seems
reasonable to also limit post-grant proceedings to documentary prior art.
The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have cited the examinational role of
the PTO to justify broader standards for claim construction and lower standards
for proving invalidity.45 For instance, the Federal Circuit held that the PTO is
not required to apply a presumption of validity for issued patents during
reexaminations, which is one form of post-grant proceeding, because no such
presumption is afforded to claims during patent prosecution.46 In so concluding,
the Court emphasized that the main purpose of reexaminations was to “increase
the reliability of the PTO’s action in issuing a patent by reexamination of patents
thought ‘doubtful.’”47 Reexaminations might replace some aspects of litigation
by “free[ing] the court from any need to consider prior art,” but this was merely
an “auxiliary function” and not the main purpose of such proceedings.48 More
recently, in Cuozzo, the Supreme Court upheld the PTO’s use of the broadest
reasonable interpretation for construing claims in IPRs, which is a standard from
patent examination.49 Although the Court recognized that the AIA made postgrant proceedings more adjudicative, the Court ultimately found that “nothing
convinces us that . . . Congress wanted to change its basic purposes, namely, to
reexamine an earlier agency decision.”50

Id. at 56.
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 27–34 (providing various discovery tools for federal civil
litigation).
44 Id.
45 In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming broadest reasonable
construction for ex parte reexaminations); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding that statutory presumption of validity for patent claims is inapplicable to
reexaminations); Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144 (affirming PTO’s use of broadest reasonable
construction in inter partes review).
46 In re Etter, 756 F.2d at 857.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144.
50 Id.
42
43

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/2

8

Liu: Balancing the Competing Functions of Patent Post-Grant Proceeding
LIU ARTICLE _COMPLETE (2) (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

10/2/2018 1:44 PM

COMPETING FUNCTIONS OF POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS

165

Thus, the balance between the examinational and adjudicative functions
impacts how the Board conducts its review and the legal standards it can apply.
The remainder of this Section takes a closer look at these respective functions.
It also provides an overview of administrative patent review in the United States,
and traces its evolution from a purely examinational proceeding to the current
“hybrid” model under the AIA.
A. THE EXAMINATIONAL FUNCTION

The traditional justification for post-grant proceedings is that it allows the
PTO to revisit its decision to grant a patent and correct any errors during
examination.51 The social and economic costs of improperly issued patents are
well-documented. Invalid patents “can result in supracompetitive pricing and
diminished quantity . . . without providing the commensurate benefits” of
disclosing an invention.”52 They can be a tool for extracting nuisance
settlements,53 as well as to stifle innovation by monopolizing foundational
technologies.54 Even where invalid patents are never enforced, they can still have
an anticompetitive effect.55 Unenforced patents deter competitors from entering
the market, drive investors and customers away from potentially infringing
products, and force companies to expend resources on design-around
solutions.56 Thus, invalid patents lead to welfare loss and skew competitive
markets even if no infringement suit is ever filed.57 Given the negative
consequences of the PTO’s errors, one goal of administrative patent review is to
give the PTO a means to correct its mistakes and protect the public from
overbroad or invalid patents. In doing so, the agency can revoke or narrow
improperly granted claims to cut off their impact on markets.58
This justification for post-grant proceedings, however, assumes the patent
system should protect against invalid patents by revisiting issued patents instead
of reducing mistakes during the initial examination. Given the cost of error, one
could argue that it would make sense to devote more resources to examining
patent applications in the first instance, instead of revisiting patents that have
already issued. Indeed, studies have shown that patent examiners often do not
have enough time or resources to fully investigate whether a patent application
Etter, 756 F.2d at 857; Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144.
Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 620.
53 Id.
54 Leslie, supra note 24, at 104; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 72 (2012).
55 Leslie, supra note 24, at 104.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED.
CIRCUIT B.J. 539, 601 (2012).
51
52
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is truly inventive.59 Likewise, some have observed that the PTO incentivizes
patent examiners to grant more patents instead of vigorously opposing dubious
applications.60 These studies suggest that devoting more resources to the initial
examination may lead to substantial improvements in overall patent quality.
Moreover, there are clear benefits to avoiding errors during examination in the
first place instead of going back to invalidate patents after they have already been
granted. An issued patent creates reliance interests in the patentee, investors,
and customers that are undermined if the patent is later revoked.61
And yet, although it may seem counterintuitive, spending more time and
money examining patent applications may be a poor allocation of social
resources. That is because most patents are not economically significant, and the
increased cost of scrutinizing every patent application in greater detail likely
outweighs the marginal benefit from such examination.62 As Professor Mark
Lemley points out,
[T]he overwhelming majority of patents are never litigated or
even licensed. Because so few patents are ever asserted against
a competitor, it is much cheaper for society to make detailed
validity determinations in those few cases than to invest
additional resources examining patents that will never be heard
from again.63
The PTO, however, is not well positioned to identify which patents are
important and which are worthless.64 Indeed, “the prevailing view of patent
examination is that it proceeds under a veil of rational ignorance, where patent
examiners seek information about patentability using only finite resources that
do not exceed the value of the information itself.”65 By contrast, industry
competitors in the same field of technology should—by hypothesis— have
better knowledge about which patents are valuable. In this sense, post-grant

59 Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data,
99 REV. ECON. & STAT. no. 3, 4 (2014); Leslie, supra note 24, at 107; Susan W. Graf, Comment,
Improving Patent Quality Through Identification of Relevant Prior Art: Approaches to Increase Information
Flow to the Patent Office, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 495, 502 (2007).
60 Id.
61 Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 108 (2011) (noting that heightened
standard of proof on invalidity protects the patentee’s reliance interests).
62 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2001).
63 Id.
64 Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Youngest Patent Validity Proceeding: Evaluating Post-Grant Review,
24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 333, 337 (2016).
65 Id.
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proceedings are a means of outsourcing to private parties the task of identifying
which patents should receive additional scrutiny.
Related to the goal of protecting the public from invalid patents, allowing the
PTO to revisit its initial decisions should also create more certainty in patent
validity and scope, as well as bolster confidence in issued patents.66 Uncertainty
about validity and scope may “cause the patent holder to under-invest in the
technology, reduce investment by potential competitors in competing technical
advances, and lead to costly litigation after both the patent holder and potential
competitors have sunk sizable investments.”67
In principle, post-grant proceedings help resolve uncertainty in three ways.
First, administrative review “fixes” patents that are overbroad or otherwise
defective by amending the claims. This allows the patentee to correct errors in
the patent before subjecting it to litigation, where such errors could invalidate
the patent altogether.68 To illustrate, suppose that a patent owner becomes aware
of a potentially invalidating prior art reference after its patent has already issued.
The patentee could ask the PTO to review the newly discovered prior art in a
post-grant proceeding like ex parte reexamination.69 If the PTO determines the
patent is valid, this would presumably reduce the likelihood that a court will later
invalidate the patent based on the same reference.70 On the other hand, if the
prior art reference indeed poses a validity problem, then the patentee can narrow
the claims to an appropriate scope.71 Either way, the patent emerges from
administrative review stronger and more likely to survive a validity challenge in
district court.72
The second way this process helps resolve uncertainty is that post-grant
proceedings provide an “early window” to resolve validity questions before
litigation. Courts cannot opine on patent validity unless there is an ongoing or
imminent lawsuit, since the Constitution limits federal courts to resolving
“[c]ases and [c]ontroversies.”73 So even if a company believes its competitor’s
patent is invalid, it must invest in a potentially infringing product and face the
risk that a court might ultimately disagree with its invalidity position.74 Coupled

Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 991.
Id.
68 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307 (1980).
69 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–305.
70 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4 (1980); Adamo, supra note 3, at 63 n.26.
71 35 U.S.C. § 305 (“In any reexamination proceeding under this chapter, the patent owner
will be permitted to propose any amendment to his patent and a new claim or claims thereto,
in order to distinguish the invention as claimed from the prior art cited.”)
72 Adamo, supra note 2, at 78.
73 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).
74 See Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 773 F.3d 1274, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that case
or controversy requirement requires courts to assess whether the declaratory judgment
plaintiff has “presented a case of sufficient ‘immediacy and reality’ ”); Matal, supra note 58, at
66
67
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with the unpredictable nature of patent litigation, being unable to challenge a
patent before litigation will undoubtedly deter some companies from investing
in a new product or service altogether.75
Unlike district courts, administrative agencies are not constrained by the
Constitution’s case or controversy clause.76 The PTO can resolve validity
disputes even if the petitioner would not have standing in federal court.77 This
allows the PTO to resolve any questions about validity early in the life of a patent,
before the patentee or its competitors have invested significant resources in
developing or commercializing a patented product.
This feature of
administrative patent review also allows groups who would not have Article III
standing to challenge dubious patents.78 Public interest organizations like the
Electronic Frontier Foundation can file petitions against issued patents at the
PTO, whereas they would not have standing to do so in court.79 Likewise,
industry groups such as Unified Patents also frequently file IPR petitions on
behalf of their members.80 This allows the PTO to review patents that impact
consumers or small businesses, even though such entities may not otherwise
have the resources to individually challenge patents in court.81
Third, some argue the existence of administrative patent review can bolster
the presumption of validity generally.82 By allowing the PTO to revisit issued
patents, the system should make it easier to challenge weaker patents and increase
public confidence in patents that remain in effect.83 This makes sense in theory,

601 (2012) (“[A] competitor cannot challenge a patent in litigation before the competitor
incurs the costs and risks of developing and marketing a product.”).
75 Leslie, supra note 24, at 113.
76 Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“An administrative
agency . . . is not subject to Article III of the Constitution of the United States.” (quoting
Pfizer, Inc. v. Shalala, 182 F.3d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1999))).
77 Pers. Audio, LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 IPR: Not Just for Litigants, RPX, (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.rpxcorp.com/2017/
02/21/ipr-not-just-for-litigants/ (describing how non-litigants are now some of the most
frequent filers of IPR petitioners).
81 Joe Mullin, Unified Patents Files Legal Challenges Against Top Three Patent Trolls of 2016,
ARSTECHNICA
(July
27,
2016,
2:39
PM),
https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2016/07/patent-defense-group-seeks-to-knock-out-top-three-trolls-of-2015/; Annie
Dike, “Goliath” Troll Under P.T.A.B. Review, NAT’L L. REV. (July 14, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/goliath-troll-under-P.T.A.B.-review.
82 Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing how
reexaminations would revive “United States industry’s competitive vitality by restoring
confidence in the validity of patents issued by the PTO.”).
83 Id.; James W. Beard, A Better Carrot Incentivizing Patent Reexamination, 1 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 169, 177–78 (2009) (“By increasing the ease with which weak patents could be
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but the verdict is still out on whether administrative review realistically bolsters
confidence in patent rights. Some have suggested that expanding administrative
patent reviews through the AIA may have actually harmed public confidence in
patents.84 For instance, one industry representative testified to the Senate
Judiciary Committee that AIA Reviews make revoking patent rights too easy
and create the perception that the PTO is biased against patent owners.85 It is
also conceivable that, by invalidating many issued patents, the PTO is signaling
that its initial examination is highly unreliable.
B. THE ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTION

The second function for post-grant proceedings is adjudicative. That is, postgrant proceedings allow the PTO to serve as an alternative forum for resolving
private disputes about patents.86 Compared to its examinational functions, this
aspect of post-grant proceedings is less intuitive. At first glance, it seems
redundant to provide a separate proceeding to litigate patent validity, given that
district courts are entirely capable of performing this role. There are, however,
important reasons why the patent system benefits from separate administrative
patent reviews that operate in parallel with district courts. Having the PTO
decide validity may be more accurate and efficient.87 It is also cheaper.88 The
resources dedicated to litigation can have a detrimental effect on business
operations, particularly for smaller companies.89 Moreover, the high cost of
litigation encourages nuisance settlements even where the patent is invalid or the
infringement case is meritless.90
To start, an agency staffed by technical experts may be better qualified to
adjudicate patent validity than judges or juries. Disputes about patent validity

challenged and invalidated, those patents that remained in effect could be afforded a stronger
presumption of validity . . . .”) .
84 S. 1137, the “Patent Act” – Finding Effective Solutions to Address Abusive Patent
Practices to S. Comm. on Judiciary (May 7, 2015) (statement of Kevin H. Rhodes),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05-07-15%20Rhodes%20Testimony.pdf
(contending that the “perception of imbalance is undermining public and investor confidence
in patent rights and the patent system”).
85 Id.
86 Janis, supra note 7, at 36.
87 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143–44 (describing how AIA Reviews were meant to be quick and
inexpensive compared to district court litigation).
88 Id.
89 Michael Liu, Joinder under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent Assertions away from
Small Businesses, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489, 495–96 (2013).
90 Jesse Greenspan, Counting the True Cost of a Nuisance Settlement, LAW360 (Aug. 28, 2008,
12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/67683/counting-the-true-cost-of-a-nuisancesettlement.
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often involve highly technical issues.91 In the United States, a patent-eligible idea
can be claimed if it is novel, non-obvious, and adequately disclosed in the patent
specification, among other requirements.92 Assessing these questions requires
knowledge of the relevant field and at least some understanding of the technical
issues involved in the patent.93 Aside from the technical nature of patent validity
itself, the objective standard for assessing questions like novelty or the adequacy
of disclosure also varies based on the field of invention.94 Questions like whether
a patent is novel are not evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person—
the standard that district court judges typically apply.95 Instead, they are assessed
through the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant technical
field, which varies based on the invention.96
Various studies have identified problems with submitting questions to juries
and judges with no technical expertise.97 One study found that juries are often
unwilling to second-guess the PTO’s decision to grant the patent.98 Yet another
concluded juries are more likely to decide patent cases on an all-or-nothing basis,
and may even be biased by which party first brought the lawsuit.99 Others have
also noted deficiencies in district court decision-making in patent disputes.100
For example, empirical studies suggest that district court claim constructions are
frequently reversed, with one paper estimating that the Federal Circuit vacated
one-third of the district court claim constructions that were appealed.101 Another
study found that half of district court claim constructions appealed to the Federal
Circuit were at least partially vacated or reversed in some form.102
91 Arti K. Rai, Patent Institutions: Shifting Interactions Between Legal Actors, 1 RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (forthcoming) (draft at 1).
92 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112.
93 See generally Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
94 Id. at 1313.
95 Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 6 (2001).
96 Id.
97 Jennifer F. Miller, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent Cases?, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., Apr.
2, 2004, ¶ 32; Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673,
1674 (2013); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases -An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 409 (2000); Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 95, at 30.
98 Lemley, supra note 97, at 1674.
99 Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases, supra note 97.
100 See generally Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 95, at 30.
101 Id. at 12.
102 Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, A Study of the Role and Impact of Special Masters in Patent
Cases, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 12 (2009), http://www.courtappointedmasters.org/
sites/default/files/specmapa.pdf. It is important to note that, even if the Federal Circuit finds
error in nearly half of all district court claim constructions, that does not mean that district
court judges are wrong half the time. Only a subset of district court decisions is appealed.
And even among the appealed cases, the appellant chooses which arguments to present before
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Because of the highly technical nature of the adjudicative facts involved with
patent validity, there is a need to “deploy[ ] greater expertise and resources at the
administrative and trial court levels.”103 Providing post-grant proceedings at the
PTO is one way to do so, as it allows parties to submit factual disputes to
technically trained judges. At the PTO, the Board consists of administrative
patent judges with “competent legal knowledge and scientific ability.”104 These
judges are divided into sections based on technical focus.105 Although it is
difficult to say for certain, there is reason to believe the Board’s specialized nature
may be yielding more accurate results on technical questions. Qualitatively, the
Board seems comfortable grappling with complex technical issues in its
opinions.106 Around 75% of Board opinions that are appealed to the Federal
Circuit are ultimately affirmed.107 The Board is also required to explain its
opinions and provide cogent rationales for either affirming or revoking claims.108
This makes the Board’s decision more transparent, and its errors easier to
identify, than the metaphorical black box of a jury verdict.
Post-grant proceedings also provide a cheaper way to invalidate patents than
district court litigation. Although costs for patent litigation have fallen in recent
years, it still remains expensive to litigate in district court.109 For patent
infringement cases with $1 million to $10 million at stake, the median cost is $1.7
million dollars.110 Where the amount at risk exceeds $25 million, the median cost
of litigation is around $ 3.3 million.111 The cost of litigation creates problems
beyond sky-high legal bills for companies. Because it can cost millions just to
take a case through discovery, there is a strong incentive for defendants to settle

the Federal Circuit. Therefore, appellants are more likely to appeal claim construction if the
claim term is difficult to construe, or where the district court decision is poorly-reasoned.
103 Rai, supra note 91, at 1.
104 35 U.S.C. § 6.
105 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE PATENT TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD, USPTO (2015), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ files/ documents/
Organizational%20Structure% 20of%20the%20Board%20May%2012%202015.pdf.
106 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for its Money: Challenging Patents
in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 261 (2015).
107 Michael Joffre et al., PTAB at 5: Part 3- Fed. Circ. Statistics, Law360 (Sept. 13, 2017, 1:44
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/961586/ptab-at-5-part-3-fed-circ-statistics.
108 Rovalma, S.A. v. Bohler-Edelstahl GmbH & Co. KG, 856 F.3d 1019, 1025 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (holding that the Board’s obviousness “analysis should be made explicit” and noting the
court has “repeatedly insisted on such explanations in reviewing the adequacy of the Board’s
analysis—both as a matter of obviousness law and as a matter of administrative law”).
109 Malathi Nayak, Cost of Patent Infringement Litigation Falling Sharply, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10,
2017), https://www.bna.com/cost-patent-infringement-n73014463011/.
110 Id.
111 Id.
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with a patentee for less than the cost of litigation.112 This encourages meritless
lawsuits to extract nuisance settlements.113 High litigation costs also
disproportionally affect small to medium sized businesses.114 Relative to their
overall budget, legal fees exact a higher toll from small companies than larger
ones.115 Likewise, devoting resources to patent litigation detracts more
significantly from the routine business operations of smaller companies.116
Providing a cheaper alternative to district court litigation should make it
harder to extract nuisance settlements. Instead of having to go through discovery
and summary judgment to invalidate an overbroad patent, the accused infringer
has the option of asking the PTO to cancel the patent administratively. 117
Litigation costs for post-grant proceedings have, in fact, been significantly lower
than district court litigation.118 The cost of a typical IPR ranges from $ 300–400
thousand, which is a fraction of the cost of discovery in district court for many
litigants.119
C. THE “HYBRID” APPROACH UNDER THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT

In the U.S., post-grant proceedings started as an examinational procedure,
but steadily transitioned towards a more adjudicative model. In 1980, Congress
passed the Patent and Trademark Laws Act, which created the first post-grant
proceeding in the form of ex parte reexamination.120 As its name would suggest,
reexamination allows the PTO to re-examine issued claims and evaluate whether
they are valid in view of new prior art or arguments.121 Initially, Congress was
more concerned about bolstering certainty in issued patent than problems
associated with high litigation costs incurred by defendants or nuisance
112 See Jesse Greenspan, Counting the True Cost of a Nuisance Settlement, LAW360 (Aug. 28, 2008,
12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/67683/counting-the-true-cost-of-a-nuisancesettlement.
113 Id.
114 Liu, supra note 89.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143–44 (2016) (summarizing legislative history of how AIA
Reviews were meant to be “a quick, inexpensive, and reliable alternative to district court
litigation”).
118 AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, 2015 REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 43 (2015), https://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/
econsurvey/2015EconomicSurvey/Pages/default.aspx.
119 Id.
120 Pub. L. No. 96-517, H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307(I), at 3 (1980).
121 Etter, 756 F.2d at 857 (“In a very real sense, the intent underlying reexamination is to
‘start over’ in the PTO with respect to the limited examination areas involved . . . as they would
have been considered if they had been originally examined . . . .”).
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settlements.122 So rather than basing its procedure on litigation, reexaminations
were designed to mimic the PTO’s initial examination.123 Accordingly, ex parte
reexaminations were conducted between the patent examiner and the patentee,
with no participation rights for the requestor.124 Inter partes reexamination were
later introduced to give limited participation rights to third-party requestors.125
Nevertheless, these proceedings were still conducted before patent examiners,
with no discovery or oral hearings.126
By the mid-2000s, policy concerns shifted away from bolstering patent
validity and towards perceived abuses of the patent system.127 A common
perception was that the PTO granted too many questionable patents that
disclosed nothing innovative, preempted basic concepts, and hampered
innovation.128 This was especially noticeable in the computer and software fields,
which experienced a steep rise in patent activity in the 1990s, due in part to the
“dot-com” boom.129 Public attention also increasingly focused on businesses
that did not sell products, but instead licensed and litigated patents to generate
revenue.130 These were called non-practicing entities or, more derisively, patent
trolls.131 When the dot-com bubble collapsed and many technology companies
failed, their patent portfolios occasionally wound up at non-practicing entities

122 Supra note 120 (describing how a new patent reexamination procedure was necessary to
“permit the owner of a patent to have the validity of his patent tested in the Patent Office”
before litigation).
123 Adamo, supra note 2, at 63–65.
124 Id. at 65-67.
125 American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 (1999); amended by
the Intellectual Property and High Technical Amendments Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273
(2002).
126 Abbott Lab. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The PTO’s
regulations for inter partes reexaminations make no provision for either party to take
depositions.”).
127 Mark Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181,
182 (2008) (“A growing chorus of voices is sounding a common refrain: the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) is issuing far too many bad patents. Look almost anywhere and you
can find entertaining examples of silly patents that surely should not have issued.”); Carl
Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1018
(2004) (“The chorus of complaints about the U.S. patent system has grown louder in recent
years . . . . Complaints regarding the patent system typically allege that the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) issues many questionable patents.”).
128 Id.
129 Keith N. Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with Applications, 96 B.U. L. REV.
1117, 1125–27 (describing factors that led to the increase in software patents).
130 John F. Luman & Christopher L. Dodson, No Longer a Myth, the Emergence of the Patent
Troll: Stifling Innovation, Increasing Litigation, and Extorting Billions, 18 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J.,
no. 5, 1 (2006).
131 Id.
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that aggressively monetized the patents through licensing and litigation.132 As a
result, there was a significant increase in patent litigation from the mid-1990s
onwards, particularly in the computer and software industry.133
In 2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act (AIA) partly to clamp
down on perceived abuses of the patent system.134 Along with other significant
changes to the patent laws, the AIA pushed post-grant proceedings decidedly
towards an adjudicative model.135 In place of inter partes reexamination, the AIA
created IPR, PGR, and transitional covered business method review (CBMR).136
PGR was designed to create a “first-window” to challenge patents shortly after
they issue.137 Petitioners can raise a broad array of invalidity arguments, but must
file their challenge no later than “9 months after the date of the grant of the
patent.”138 By contrast, IPR is available for the entire life of the patent but is
limited to invalidity arguments based on prior art publications or patents.139
Finally, CBMR is only available for business method patents and will be phased
out by 2020 unless Congress decides to extend the program.140
The overall procedure for IPR, PGR, and CBMR is similar. Each starts with
a petition challenging an issued patent.141 The Board then issues an institution
decision, which is a preliminary determination as to whether the petition raises a
reasonable likelihood of invalidity for one or more claims of the challenged
patent.142 If review is instituted, the parties make arguments to a panel of three
administrative patent judges, and the proceedings allow for limited discovery and
an oral hearing.143 At this time, the patent owner can also file a motion to amend
the claims.144 Within one year of institution, the Board issues a final written

132 David G. Barker, Troll Or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with An Open Post-Grant Review, 4
DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 1, 1–2 (2005) (describing the sale of Commerce One’s patent portfolio
to a non-practicing entity during a bankruptcy auction).
133 Hylton, supra note 129, at 1125–26; James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis is Really a Software
Patent Crisis, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch
/wp/2013/09/03/the-patent-troll-crisis-is-really-a-software-patentcrisis/?utm_term=.8909c5855d14.
134 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329-331 (2011).
135 H.R. REP. NO. 112–98, pt. 1, at 46–47 (2011); Cuozzo, at 2143.
136 Supra note 134, at §§ 6, 18.
137 Matal, supra note 58, at 601, 609–10.
138 35 U.S.C. § 321(c).
139 Id. § 311.
140 Supra note 134, at § 18.
141 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 312, 322.
142 See id. §§ 314, 324.
143 Id. § 6; 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.51–42.53, 42.70.
144 35 U.S.C. § 316(d).
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decision on the patentability of the challenged claims and any newly proposed
claims.145
Although the AIA made administrative patent reviews more adjudicative, the
new proceedings also retained some examinational characteristics, most notably
the ability to amend the patent to avoid cited prior art.146 Petitioners do not need
Article III standing, and they are only required to prove invalidity by a
preponderance of the evidence.147 By contrast, accused infringers in district
court litigation must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. 148
Through its regulatory authority, the PTO also imported key legal standards from
reexaminations, including the broadest reasonable interpretation for claim
construction.149 This is different than the legal standard in district courts, which
apply the ordinary meaning of the claim as it would be understood by someone
skilled in the technical field of the invention.150 In theory, the broadest
reasonable construction covers more prior art and makes AIA reviews more
favorable for petitioners.151 By being over inclusive, this standard is intended to
force applicants to draft more precise claims, which in turn protects the public
from overbroad or vague patents.152
Various patent owners, however, argued that the PTO’s decision to use
examinational legal standards like the broadest reasonable interpretation is
inconsistent with the adjudicative model for AIA Reviews.153 They reasoned
that, if AIA Reviews were meant to replace district court litigation, then the PTO
should use the same standards as district courts to construe claims.154 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument in Cuozzo.155 In doing so, the Court
recognized the adjudicative aspect of AIA Reviews but ultimately characterized
them as hybrid proceedings with both examination and litigation-like

35 U.S.C. §§ 318, 328.
Id. § 316(d).
147 Id. §§ 311, 316(e).
148 Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
149 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (establishing broadest reasonable construction standard for IPR);
Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1572 (describing use of broadest reasonable interpretation for ex parte
reexaminations).
150 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
151 Lewis & Irving, supra note 20, at 59.
152 Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571 (explaining that the broadest reasonable interpretation
“serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given
broader scope than is justified”); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“An essential
purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and
unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as
possible, during the administrative process.”).
153 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 2144.
145
146
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characteristics.156
The Court explained that “nothing convinces us
that . . . Congress wanted to change its basic purposes, namely, to reexamine an
earlier agency decision.”157 And the Court also observed that “in addition to
helping resolve concrete patent-related disputes among parties, IPRs protect the
public’s ‘paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within
their legitimate scope.’ ”158 Because of their hybrid nature, the PTO is entitled
to apply examinational standards like the broadest reasonable construction.159
Recently, the PTO has revisited its position regarding the broadest reasonable
interpretation.160 Under Director Andrei Iancu, the PTO has announced
proposed rulemaking that would “replace the broadest reasonable interpretation
(“BRI”) standard for construing unexpired patent claims and proposed claims in
these trial proceedings with a standard that is the same as the standard applied in
federal district courts.”161 The PTO’s notice of proposed rulemaking relied
heavily on the adjudicative function of post-grant proceedings.162 For instance,
the PTO stressed the need to “[m]inimize differences between claim
construction standards used in the various fora could lead to greater uniformity
and predictability of the patent grant.”163 And, the PTO cited Congress’s intent
“to provide ‘quick and cost-effective alternatives’ to litigation in the courts.”164
In doing so, the PTO’s proposed rule likely signals a wider shift towards an
adjudicative model for post-grant proceedings under Director Iancu.
III. LIMITS OF THE EXAMINATIONAL FUNCTION UNDER THE AIA
There is no doubt that Congress intended to make post-grant proceedings
under the AIA more adjudicative than previous proceedings like ex parte
reexaminations.165 The House Judiciary Committee Report states that the AIA
“converts inter partes reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative
proceeding.”166 And during debates in the Senate, Senator Kyl described how

Id.
Id.
158 Id. (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816
(1945)).
159 Id.
160 Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 21221 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
161 Id. at 21221.
162 Id. at 21225.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 21223.
165 Id.
166 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 46–8 (2011); see also Matal, supra note 58, at 620.
156
157
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converting reexaminations to an adjudicative proceeding represents an
“important structural change… in which the petitioner, rather than the [PTO]
bears the burden of showing unpatentability.”167 But as the Supreme Court also
correctly observed in Cuozzo, the structure of AIA Reviews continue to reflect
examinational policy goals in other respects.168 For instance, the burden of proof
for invalidity is preponderance of the evidence, which is lower than the clear and
convincing evidence standard that district courts apply.169 The AIA also
guarantees patent owners the opportunity to amend challenged claims instead of
having their patents revoked altogether.170
These provisions have led courts to recognize that AIA Reviews are intended,
at least in part, to correct mistakes from examination and strengthen existing
patent rights.171 But does the reality of AIA Reviews actually reflect these goals?
In other words, do AIA Reviews narrow patents to “their legitimate scope” and
protect the public from dubious patents172— or are these proceedings doing the
same thing as district court validity litigation? If AIA Reviews only function as
an alternative litigation forum for all practical purposes, then using legal
standards from examination seems hard to justify.
Presently, AIA Reviews look more like litigation than anything that could be
fairly described as examination. The majority of AIA Reviews are conducted
alongside district court litigation involving the same patents, which are frequently
stayed pending the PTO’s decision.173 The Board does not examine patent
claims, but instead relies on petitioners to raise invalidity arguments.174 If the
petitioner drops out, the Board usually does not continue reviewing the
challenged patent even if it already found a reasonable likelihood that the claims

167 Matal, supra note 58, at 620–1 (quoting 157 CONG. REC. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Kyl)).
168 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144.
169 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
170 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144.
171 Id.; Aqua Prod., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The goal underlying
the AIA is twofold: (1) eliminating patents that foster abusive litigation; and (2) affirming and
strengthening viable patents.”).
172 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144 (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)).
173 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69; Jonathan Stroud, Linda Thayer & Jeffrey C.
Totten, Stay Awhile: The Evolving Law of District Court Stays in Light of Inter Partes Review, PostGrant Review, and Covered Business Method Post-Grant Review, 11 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226, 238
(2015) (“Current research shows that to date, approximately 58% of requests for stays across
all district courts have been granted outright, 6% partially granted, 29% denied, and 7%
pending.”).
174 2016 Rule Amendments, supra note 21, at 18754 (“The Board does not conduct a prior
art search to evaluate the patentability of the proposed substitute claims, and any such
requirement would be impractical given the statutory structure of AIA proceedings.”).
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are invalid.175 Moreover, because the PTO required patentees to prove the
validity of proposed amended claims, very few patentees successfully amended
their claims even though the AIA guarantees an opportunity to do so.176
Although the Federal Circuit recently overturned the PTO’s standard on motions
to amend, the practical impact of the court’s decision remains unclear.177
This section looks at why AIA Reviews are predominantly adjudicative in
practice, and identifies two aspects of these proceedings that undermine their
examinational function. First, the Board cannot independently examine the
validity of challenged claims, and must rely almost exclusively on the petitioner’s
arguments.178 Although Congress deliberately placed the onus of proving
invalidity on petitioners, this feature of AIA Reviews can be problematic if the
parties settle or the patent owner amends the claims.179 In either case, the
petitioner may not have reason to argue for invalidation, and the Board cannot
properly guard against invalid patents without evaluating the claims
independently.180
Second, the AIA fails to adequately incentivize early resolution of patent
validity. The opportunity to resolve patent validity early is one of the key benefits
of administrative patent review.181 It allows the PTO to revoke invalid patents
to cut off their competition distorting effects, or, if the claims are confirmed,
give patent owners greater certainty to invest in patented products.182 But instead
of encouraging early validity challenges, the AIA estoppel provisions discourage
parties from filing PGR petitions, which are available within nine months of
patent issuance.183 And by doing so, the statutory scheme pushes parties towards
IPRs, which are available throughout the life of the patent, and often used only
when litigation is imminent.184

175 See 35 U.S.C. § 317 (“An inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be
terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and the patent
owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for
termination is filed.”).
176 Aqua Prod., 872 F.3d at 1300.
177 Id. at 1296.
178 See infra Part IV.A.
179 See infra Part III.A.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See supra Part II.A
183 See infra Part III.B.
184 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69 (“[A]bout 86.7 % of IP- or CBM-challenged
patents are also being litigated in the federal courts”); Pedram Sameni, Patexia Chart 44: Eighty
Percent of IPR Filings are for Defensive Purposes, PATEXIA (Nov. 8, 2017), https://
www.patexia.com/feed/patexia-chart-44-80-percent-of-ipr-filings-are-for-defensivepurposes-20171107.
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A. LACK OF INDEPENDENT EXAMINATION

First, consider whether the Board should have an independent role in
evaluating the validity of a challenged patent, or if it should be limited to
assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ arguments. If
administrative patent review is primarily defined by its adjudicative function, then
the Board has no need to conduct an independent examination of challenged
claims. Instead, it should act as a neutral adjudicator like a judge or jury.185 And
in that role, the Board should not make independent fact-findings or raise new
arguments based on the prior art. On the other hand, because revoking invalid
patents serves the public interest, one could argue the PTO should have authority
to supplement the petitioner’s arguments based on the Board’s own
understanding of the prior art, or even invalidate claims on grounds that may not
have been raised by the petitioner at all. For examinational proceeding like ex
parte reexaminations, the PTO can review and cancel an issued patent sua sponte
if the agency believes there was a substantial new question of patentability.186
Under the AIA, however, the Board can do little to cancel or narrow claims
if the petitioner stops participating or drops out. If both parties ask to terminate
the proceeding, the Board shall do so “unless the Office has decided the merits
of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.”187 Thus, the Board
will stop an AIA Review upon the parties’ request even after it has already
determined there is a reasonable likelihood that the challenged patent is
invalid.188 By contrast, if the requestor in a reexamination asks for the
proceeding to be terminated, the examiner is still supposed to “make a thorough
study of the patent and a thorough investigation of the available prior art relating
to the subject matter of the claimed invention.”189 The AIA also limits the PTO’s
ability to raise arguments that were not presented by the petitioner. For instance,
the AIA states that petitioners have the burden of proving the unpatentability of
each challenged claim and must explain each ground of invalidity with
particularity.190
Moreover, as a practical matter, the Board’s ability to raise new arguments or
introduce evidence is limited by the structure of AIA Reviews and the Board’s

See, e.g., Janis, supra note 7, at 13–14.
35 U.S.C. § 304.
187 35 U.S.C. § 317.
188 The Board must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability
before it can institute review. Around 22% of instituted reviews are terminated by settlement
in 2016–2017. In 2014, the percentage of cases settled post-institution was as high as 40%.
2017 TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 10.
189 In re AT & T Intellectual Prop. II, L.P., 856 F.3d 991, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming
Board’s decision to initiate reexamination over the original requestor’s objections).
190 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3).
185
186
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institutional capacity.191 Timing-wise, the statutory deadline to issue a final
written decision limits the Board’s ability to conduct an independent prior art
review.192 While patent reexaminations can last for several years, AIA reviews
must be completed within one year of institution.193 And unlike in
reexamination, where the PTO and the patent owner can engage in back-andforth arguments, the Board generally takes a back-seat during AIA reviews.
Instead of issuing “office actions” that set forth grounds for invalidity, the Board
only issues two substantive decisions on patentability: an institution decision and
a final written decision.194 The institution decision is based on an incomplete
record.195 On the other hand, because the final written decision occurs at the
end of the proceedings, new rationales for invalidity can deprive the patent
owner of adequate notice and opportunity to respond.196 So while the Board has
some leeway to base its final decision on its own analysis, more substantial
departures from the petitioner’s invalidity positions pose a due process
problem.197
From an institutional standpoint, AIA Reviews are also conducted by an
adjudicative body rather than one that is examinational. AIA Reviews start and
end before a panel of administrative patent judges.198 Unlike patent examiners,
administrative patent judges do not search for prior art or examine claims.199 By
contrast, reexaminations are conducted by patent examiners, who can
independently evaluate the patent and prior art even if the requestor is no longer
participating.200 Reexaminations only proceed to the Board after the examiner
has already reached a decision to uphold or invalidate the patent.201 In short,

2016 Rule Amendments, supra note 21, at 18754.
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
193 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 58 (“The reexaminations themselves took an average
of 39.5 months, and then had to be appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences.”).
194 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.108, 42.108.
195 See id. § 42.108(c) (describing how Board must base its institution decision on the petition
and patent owner preliminary response).
196 SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC., 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (vacating
Board decision because it adopted a new claim construction in the final written decision
without providing adequate notice to the patent owner).
197 Compare Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that
“the Board was entitled to rely on its own reading” of the prior art to find the claim obvious),
with SAS, 825 F.3d at 1351.
198 35 U.S.C. § 6.
199 2016 Rule Amendments, supra note 21, at 18754.
200 AT&T, 856 F.3d at 994 (affirming Board’s decision to initiate reexamination over the
original requestor’s objections).
201 35 U.S.C.A. § 315 (2002) (superseded by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)).
191
192
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because of its procedural and institutional constraints, the Board performs few
tasks that could be considered “examinational.”
Nevertheless, given that Congress made a deliberate policy choice to move
from an examinational to an adjudicative model for post-grant proceedings, it
makes sense for the Board to serve as a neutral adjudicator instead of revoking
patents based on its own view of the prior art. And in many cases, the Board’s
inability to rely on its own examination of the prior art likely has no practical
significance. As discussed in Part III, one reason for having post-grant
proceedings is to outsource the prior art search and analysis to interested private
parties.202 Most petitioners have strong incentives to find the most relevant prior
art and present vigorous arguments to invalidate challenged patents. Therefore,
the PTO can usually protect the public from dubious patents by acting as a
neutral adjudicator and assessing the petitioner’s arguments. Things only start
to break down, however, where the petitioner identifies a potentially invalid
patent but is no longer incentivized to continue arguing for invalidity. This can
occur after settlement or when the patentee tries to amend the claims.
Settlement is the first situation where limits on the Board’s ability to rely on
its own view of the prior art becomes problematic. The AIA allows petitioners
to settle with the patent owner and voluntarily move to terminate the AIA
Review.203 Over the past two years, approximately 14% of AIA Reviews are
settled before the Board institutes review, and 22% of instituted reviews also
ended in settlement.204 There are strong policy reasons for promoting
settlement, which conserves private and agency resources.205 And it would surely
undermine any motivation to settle if the parties believe the PTO will cancel the
patent regardless.
There are, however, social costs to settlement as well, particularly with respect
to patent validity disputes. Allowing parties to terminate an AIA review deprives
the public of the Board’s opinion on validity. This allows some improperly
granted patents to survive review even if they would otherwise have been
invalidated absent settlement.206 Further, settlement also allows the patentee to
preserve a potentially invalid patent by granting a license to one company, but
leveraging the same patent against subsequent competitors. Indeed, the Second
Circuit has lamented the “troubling dynamic” in which “[t]he less sound the
patent . . . , the more a rule permitting settlement is likely to benefit the patent
holder by allowing it to retain the patent.”207 The court noted that “[s]o long as
the law encourages settlement, weak patent cases will likely be settled even

202
203
204
205
206
207

See supra Part III.A.
35 U.S.C. § 317.
2017 TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 10.
Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id.
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though such settlements will inevitably protect patent monopolies that are,
perhaps, undeserved.”208 Likewise, Professor Joseph Miller explains how patent
invalidity judgments can be viewed as a public good because it clears the way for
competitors to enter the market, even if those other competitors were not
involved in the litigation.209 However, this creates a free-rider problem for patent
challengers because their competitors do not have to expend resources to
invalidate the patent, but still receive the same benefits from invalidation.210 This
dynamic encourages challengers to settle instead of invalidating the patent, which
in turn allows patent owners to continue asserting patents that may have been
improperly granted.211
The problems associated with patent settlements occur in both district court
litigation and post-grant proceedings. Unlike district courts, however, the Board
is expressly charged with protecting the public against dubious patents and
promoting certainty in patent rights—at least to the extent AIA Reviews function
as “hybrid proceedings.”212 But unless the Board has the capacity to
independently evaluate challenged claims, it cannot realistically carry out this
public protection function once the petitioner drops out. This allows the patent
owner to preserve invalid patents through settlement, even at the PTO. And as
the Second Circuit observed, patent owners are more motivated to settle
invalidity challenges against patents that are “less sound.”213
Nor do settlements in AIA Reviews further the goal of creating more
certainty in patent rights, which depends on information about patent validity
and scope. Settlements prevent such information from being produced and
disseminated.214 In some cases, settlement can even be a deliberate “technique
for preserving uncertainty regarding the patent rights at issue. That uncertainty
is of value both to the patentee and to the alleged infringer if the patent is in fact
invalid, because the settlement allows them both privileged access to the
market.”215
The lack of independent examination can also be a problem when the
patentee tries to amend the claims. Although the interests of the petitioner and
Id.
Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 687–88 (2004); see also Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives
to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 968 (2004).
210 Miller, supra note 9, at 687–88.
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144.
213 In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211.
214 Mark R. Patterson, Leveraging Information About Patents: Settlements, Portfolios, and Holdups, 50
HOUS. L. REV. 483, 497–98 (2012).
215 Id.
208
209
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the public are usually aligned when it comes to invalidating the issued claims,
they may not be similarly aligned with respect to opposing proposed amended
claims.216 For instance, patent owners may narrow their claims such that
petitioners are no longer at risk of infringement.217 Even if the amended claims
do not impact the petitioners, however, they can still be asserted against
subsequent infringers.
The PTO recognized the challenge of protecting the public against potentially
invalid claims without the ability to independently evaluate validity. As the PTO
explained:
The Board does not conduct a prior art search to evaluate the
patentability of the proposed substitute claims, and any such
requirement would be impractical given the statutory structure
of AIA proceedings. If a motion to amend is granted, the
substitute claims become part of an issued patent, without any
further examination by the Office. 218
To resolve this conundrum, the PTO tried to shoehorn claim amendments
into the adjudicative structure of AIA reviews by requiring patent owners to
prove patentability.219 Under the PTO’s initial approach, patentees seeking to
amend their claims in an AIA Review must explain why their claims are
patentable over the prior art of record.220 This rule “account[s] for the absence
of an independent examination by the Office where a prior art search is
performed as would be done during prosecution of a patent application,
reexamination, or reissue.”221 In other words, the PTO tried to make up for the
examiner’s absence by forcing patent owners to show why their proposed claims
are valid.
Despite the PTO’s rationale for placing the burden of proof on patent
owners, the Federal Circuit ultimately held that it was improper to do so in Aqua
Products v. Matal.222 This decision largely turned on whether the PTO’s rule

216 See International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. v. United States, IPR2013-00124, 2014 WL
2120542 (PTAB May 20, 2014) (granting unopposed motion to amend claims).
217 Aqua Prod., 872 F.3d at 1349 (“[I]f no petitioner opposes a motion to amend, or the
opposition is inadequate in the Board’s view, the record may not contain readily available prior
art or arguments that were immaterial to the issued claims but that would render the substitute
claims unpatentable.”).
218 2016 Rule Amendments, supra note 21, at 18754.
219 See Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No. IPR2012-00027, 2013 WL 5947697, at *4
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013); MasterImage 3D, Inc. v. Reald Inc., No. IPR2015-00040, 2015 WL
4383224, at *2–4 (P.T.A.B. July 15, 2015).
220 Id.
221 2016 Rule Amendments, supra note 21, at 18754.
222 Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1296.
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should receive Chevron deference.223 However, the Federal Circuit also expressed
concerns about the difficulty of amending claims under the PTO’s approach, and
how it seems inconsistent with the Board’s looser standard on claim
construction.224 The court’s lead opinion, for example, noted that “the PTO has
more than once acknowledged that use of the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard is only appropriate when patent owners have the opportunity to
amend,” and yet “[t]he PTO’s statistics confirm that patent owners have
consistently failed to obtain their requested relief on motions to amend.”225 With
respect to the prospect of unexamined claims, the lead opinion observed that
[T]he ‘worst’ possible outcome is that a patent issues in which
the previously-examined claims have been narrowed and
clarified in such a way that the petitioner does not fear its ability
to continue to make, use, or sell its own product, and the public
is put on notice of exactly how to innovate around those claims
in the future.226
The court also noted that amended claims will only issue where “the PTO
will have been unable to conclude that any issued amended claims are
unpatentable under very relaxed standards—preponderance of the evidence and
broadest reasonable interpretation.”227
Aqua Products made AIA Reviews more in line with adjudications, but the
decision did little to address issues associated with the Board’s inability to
examine claims. The lead opinion noted that unexamined claims should not
create significant problems because claims can only be narrowed during AIA
Reviews.228 But just because a claim is narrowed, does not mean it becomes valid.
Unless the proposed claims are scrutinized for validity, the patentee could narrow
the claim enough to avoid the challenger’s product or prior art reference, but still
keep the claim broad enough to cover other competitor’s products. In a sense,
those other competitors are silent participants to the PTO’s proceedings because
their right to make or use their products will likely be affected by the outcome.229
To the extent AIA Reviews serve a public protection function, the PTO should
consider their interests as well. Moreover, although the PTO applies a lower
“preponderance of the evidence” standard on invalidity, this still assumes there
Id. at 1327–28.
Id. at 1300.
225 Id. at 1299-1300.
226 Id. at 1315.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 1314.
229 Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1009 (describing the public as a silent participant in
post-grant proceedings).
223
224

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/2

28

Liu: Balancing the Competing Functions of Patent Post-Grant Proceeding
LIU ARTICLE _COMPLETE (2) (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

10/2/2018 1:44 PM

COMPETING FUNCTIONS OF POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS

185

is another party opposing the amended claims. If the petitioner stops
participating, who is left to introduce any evidence of invalidity, much less meet
the preponderance of the evidence standard? In this scenario, the Board must
independently examine the proposed claims, thus taking on a role that it is poorly
suited to perform.
In the PTO’s guidance on motions to amend after Aqua Products, the Chief
Administrative Patent Judge instructed the Board that, so long as a motion to
amend is technically compliant, then “the Board will proceed to determine
whether the substitute claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the
evidence based on the entirety of the record, including any opposition made by
the petitioner.”230 However, it is unclear if the Board would supplement the
record or introduce new arguments if there is no opposition by the petitioner.
Judge Taranto’s opinion in Aqua suggest the Board might have broad authority
to “sua sponte introduce evidence or arguments into the record—and rely on
them after giving notice and opportunity to be heard.”231 But as discussed above,
the problem goes beyond the Board’s statutory authority to introduce evidence
or arguments. Rather, the Board’s ability to examine claims is also limited by the
procedural and institutional structure of AIA Reviews.
B. ESTOPPEL EFFECTS OF AIA REVIEWS

The AIA’s estoppel provisions also undermine the examinational function of
AIA Reviews by creating disincentives for filing early validity challenges, which
is a key feature of post-grant proceedings that distinguishes them from district
court litigation.232 Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e), petitioners are estopped from
raising invalidity defenses in litigation that it “raised or reasonably could have
raised” in a previous AIA Review that reached a final written decision.233 And
they are precluded from petitioning for AIA Review altogether if they have
previously filed a declaratory judgment of invalidity in district court.234 These
estoppel provisions prevent parties from re-litigating the same issues through
multiple AIA reviews or across different forums.235
If AIA reviews are viewed as a replacement for litigation, then it makes sense
to broadly prohibit parties from challenging the same patent multiple times. The
finality of judgments “encourages reliance on judicial decisions, bars vexatious
230 David P. Ruschke, Guidance on Motions to Amend in view of Aqua Products, USPTO (Nov.
21, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_on_motions_to_amend_11_2017.pdf.
231 872 F.3d at 1322 n.7 (2018).
232 See supra Part III.A.
233 35 U.S.C. § 315(c).
234 Id. § 315(a).
235 Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (citing 154 CONG. REC. S9989 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement
by Sen. Kyl)).
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litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other disputes.”236 Moreover, the
legislative history of the AIA suggests the law was intended to “[f]orce a party to
bring all of [its] claims in one forum . . . and therefore to eliminate the need to
press any claims in other fora.”237 Without estoppel, parties could mount
separate validity challenges and wipe out any efficiencies or cost savings of
administrative patent review.
By contrast, broad estoppel for post-grant proceedings will inevitably deter
some parties from challenging dubious patents.238 This means patents that might
otherwise be cancelled will instead remain uncontested. Another downside is
that estoppel provisions discourage parties from challenging patents through
PGR, since it may be difficult to “discover a potentially invalid patent and to file
a review on all possible grounds within nine months.”239 The risk of estoppel,
coupled with the limited time period for filing PGRs, pushes parties to rely on
IPRs because they are available throughout the life of the patent.240 Most IPRs
are initiated only when there is already imminent or pending litigation over the
challenged patents.241 This is noteworthy because post-grant proceedings are
based on the understanding that improperly granted patents adversely affect
competition even if they are never litigated.242 It would defeat this feature of
AIA Reviews if such proceedings are only used concurrently with litigation.
The PTO’s experience with inter partes reexamination provides a stark
example of how broad estoppel can undermine the effectiveness of post-grant
proceedings. Initially, ex parte reexaminations did not permit third party
participation, but also did not preclude third-party requestors from asserting
invalidity in subsequent litigation.243 Later, Congress created inter partes
reexaminations to allow the third-party requestor to participate in the
proceedings.244 But as a trade-off, inter partes reexaminations broadly prohibited
third-party requestors from asserting in litigation the “invalidity of any claim
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979).
Synopsys, 814 F.3d at 1332 (Newman, J., dissenting).
238 Matal, supra note 58, at 617.
239 Susan J. Marsnik, Will the America Invents Act Post-Grant Review Improve the Quality of Patents?
A Comparison with the European Patent Office Opposition, in THE CHANGING FACE OF U.S. PATENT
LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON BUSINESS STRATEGY 201–02 (Daniel R. Choy & Lynda J. Oswald
eds., 2013).
240 Jeffrey A. Miller et al., Post-Grant Review: A Promising New Tool for Invalidating Patents?,
Arnold & Porter (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/01/postgrant-review-a-promising.
241 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69.
242 Leslie, supra note 24, at 104.
243 In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[D]enial of a request for reexamination
does not deprive the requestor (if not the patent owner) ‘of any legal right’ to contest validity
in subsequent court proceedings.”).
244 American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 (1999).
236
237
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finally determined to be valid and patentable on any ground which the third-party
requester raised or could have raised during the inter partes reexamination
proceedings.”245 The general consensus is this provision was too draconian and
over-deterred parties from seeking inter partes reexamination.246 For example, the
PTO projected that it would receive 600 requests within the first five years of
inter partes reexaminations.247 Instead, it received only fifty-three requests.248
Because inter partes reexamination failed to weed out bad patents, Congress
narrowed the scope of estoppel for AIA Reviews to promote wider use of these
proceedings.249 Rather than precluding all arguments the petitioner “could have
raised,” the AIA added the term “reasonably.”250 During Senate debates, Senator
Kyl explained how this language “softens the could-have-raised estoppel that is
applied by inter partes review against subsequent civil litigation.’ ”251 He noted
that “[a]dding the modifier ‘reasonably’ ensures that could-have-raised estoppel
extends only to that prior art which a skilled searcher conducting a diligent search
reasonably could have been expected to discover.”252 This language prevents
courts from precluding litigants from raising any issue that was “physically
possible to raise in the inter partes reexamination, even if only a scorched-earth
search around the world would have uncovered the prior art in question.”253
Accordingly, the AIA’s approach represented a middle ground between inter
partes reexamination’s broad estoppel provisions and proposals to limit estoppel
only to issues actually raised and decided by the Board.254
Despite this legislative compromise, the scope of estoppel still remains a
contentious issue. For example, patent owners often point to “follow-on” IPR
petitions as evidence that the AIA estoppel is inadequate.255 Because § 315(e)
only applies to IPRs that “result[ ] in a final written decision,” there is no estoppel
if the challenger petitions for review, but is denied institution.256 Accordingly,
some petitioners file “follow-on petitions” if their earlier petition is denied or
partially instituted. Around 21% of all petitions can be categorized as “follow35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (emphasis added).
Vishnubhakat, supra note 64, at 346.
247 See
Report to Congress on Inter Partes Reexamination at 4, USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexamreport.pdf (last visited Aug.
1, 2017).
248 Id.
249 Matal, supra note 58, at 618.
250 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (emphasis added).
251 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Matal, supra note 58, at 616–17.
255 Steve Brachmann, Three rounds of IPR petitions invalidates VirnetX patent after Apple gets around
statute of limitations, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/11/
16/ipr-petitions-virnetx-patent-apple-statute-of-limitations/id=90233/.
256 35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
245
246
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on” because they are filed after the preliminary reply or the institution decision.257
The PTO has recognized that, in some instances, such petitions are used to
harass patent owners, and can “frustrate the purpose” of AIA Reviews as “quick
and cost effective alternatives to litigation.”258 To address this issue, the PTAB
established a multi-factor test to determine whether the Board should exercise
its discretion to deny institution without reaching the merits.259 The Supreme
Court’s recent decision in SAS v. ComplementSoft will also curtail the practice of
follow-on petitions. In that case, the Court held that the Board must institute
review on an all-or-nothing basis and eliminated partial institutions.260 This
forces the PTO to incorporate all challenged claims in the final written decision,
and make all of them subject to estoppel. 261
In other respects, however, the AIA’s estoppel provisions still over-deter
parties from seeking review, particularly within the nine-month window for
PGR. The statutory estoppel provisions for PGR and IPR are the same, and
both prohibit the petitioner from making any arguments “that the petitioner
raised or reasonably could have raised” before the Board.262 But whereas IPR
petitioners are limited to arguments based on prior art printed publications or
patents, PGR petitioners can essentially raise any invalidity argument available in
district court.263 Therefore, there are more grounds that a petitioner “reasonably
could have raised” in PGR than IPR, and the former likely has a broader estoppel
effect even though the statutory language is the same.264 Given its potential for
broad estoppel, patent practitioners have urged caution before seeking PGRs.265
The PTO’s statistics likewise indicate that parties rarely invoke PGR. By the end
of 2017, there have only been eighty-six PGR petitions.266 Because PGRs are
only available for patents with an effective filing date after March 2013, the PTO

257 Chat with the Chief: An Analysis of Multiple Petitions in AIA Trials at 14, USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Chat_with_the_Chief_Boardside_C
hat_Multiple_Petition_Study_20171024.pdf. (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
258 Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’Real Foods, LLC, IPR2017-00765, 2017 WL 3268945,
at *3 (July 31, 2017) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 112–98, pt.1, at 48 (2011)).
259 General Plastic Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case No. IPR2016-01357,
Paper 19 (Sep. 6, 2017) (listing seven-factor test).
260 SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018)
261 Id.
262 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1).
263 35 U.S.C. § 321(b)
264 Miller et al., supra note 240 (“Because PGRs have significantly more draconian estoppel
possibilities, potential petitioners should consider whether they should wait out the nine
month window for filing a PGR petition and instead file either an IPR petition or, if available,
a CBM petition.”).
265 Id.
266 2017 TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 3.
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has only recently started issuing patents that qualify for this proceeding.267 But
even accounting for this fact, less than 0.1% of eligible patents have been
opposed through PGR.268
This result seems contrary to the policy behind PGRs. If anything, the
estoppel provisions for PGR should be narrower than IPR. AIA reviews aim to
protect the public from invalid patents and create certainty in patent rights. 269
Both objectives are better served if validity challenges are raised early in the life
of the patent. As the former Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination
Policy explained, “[t]hird parties should be encouraged to test patent claims as
early as possible after issuance, when patent holders have invested the least
resources and the opportunity for third parties to change course in the market is
greatest.”270 He also noted how a “first window” of nine months to two years
was important because “[s]ubsequent to this period, the likelihood that the patent
owner would be practicing the invention more widely and that third parties might
perform potentially infringing activities leads to a heightened need to protect
patent owners against potentially harassing conduct.”271 More recently, this issue
was raised during the Supreme Court arguments in Oil States.272 Justice Breyer,
for example, was concerned about situations where a company has invested
billions to develop a patented concept, only to have its patent invalidated at the
PTO.273 Such losses could be avoided if patent validity and scope were settled
soon after issuance. Aside from providing certainty, early challenges to validity
also benefit the public by cutting off the competition distorting effects of
improperly granted patents. Indeed, it matters little to the public if an improperly
granted patent is challenged shortly before it expires, since any associated
economic and social costs will have already been incurred.
Given the benefits of early resolution, it would make sense to incentivize
PGR over IPR. But contrary to this policy goal, imposing broader estoppel for
PGR encourages petitioners to delay challenging issued patents.274 Recent
statistics suggest that AIA reviews are not particularly effective for resolving
patent rights early, but are used primarily as an alternative forum for litigation.275
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6 (f)(2)(A).
In 2016, the PTO granted approximately 300,000 utility patents, and roughly 40% of all
issued patents qualified for PGR. Dennis Crouch, AIA Patents: Now Most Issued Patents are AIA
Patents, PATENTLYO (July 18, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/07/patents-mostissued.html.
269 See supra Part II.A.
270 Stephen G. Kunin & Anton W. Fetting, The Metamorphosis of Inter Partes Reexamination, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 976 (2004).
271 Id.
272 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-32, Oil States, No. 16-712 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017), https:/
/www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-712_7kh7.pdf.
273 Id. at 29.
274 Marsnik, supra note 239, at 201–02.
275 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69.
267
268
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One 2016 study found that around 86.8% of IPR and CBMR involved patents
that were concurrently litigated in court.276 In some cases, the petitioner may
not have filed an early petition because they were not aware of the patent until
they received a demand letter or complaint. Or there may be many patents and
claims covering the same product, and the petitioner could not determine which
claims the patentee intended to assert until litigation. But regardless, because
post-grant proceedings are used predominately when there is concurrent
litigation, the AIA has probably failed to promote early resolution of patent
validity or claim scope.
Interestingly, Congress was aware of the downsides for imposing broad
estoppel on PGRs and sought to avoid these results. Initially, the estoppel
provisions for both IPR and PGR were limited to the grounds actually raised and
decided.277 To prevent repetitive challenges throughout the life of the patent,
Congress broadened the estoppel provision for IPR to include the “reasonably
could have raised” language. However, this amendment was never supposed to
be added to the PGR estoppel provision.278 Senator Kyl noted that
“[c]hallengers who use [PGR] will be estopped in litigation from raising only those
issues that were raised and decided in the post-grant review, rather than all issues that could
have been raised, the standard employed in inter partes reexamination.”279 And
yet, the final version of the AIA included the “reasonably could have raised”
language in the PGR estoppel provisions as well, which was likely the result of a
scrivener’s error.280
IV. COMPARISON WITH THE EUROPEAN MODEL
Thus far, this Article has focused on post-grant proceedings in the U.S., and
has identified two issues that undercut the PTO’s examinational function in AIA
reviews. To understand how an alternative model for post-grant proceedings
might impact the balance between the examinational and adjudicative functions,
this Section looks to oppositions at the European Patent Office (EPO). Like the
PTO, the EPO also provides a “first window” to challenge the validity of recently

Id.
Matal, supra note 58, at 617–18.
278 Brent Kendall, Scrivener’s Error Undercuts Patent-Law Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/scrivener8217s-error-undercuts-patentlaw-overhaul1382917120 (“The bill’s supporters said they didn’t immediately notice the change, which was
later attributed to a scrivener’s error. The final wording ‘is widely recognized’ as a mistake,
Teresa Stanek Rea, deputy director of the Patent Office, said in a speech last week.”).
279 Senate Debate 157 CONG. REC. S1360–S1394 (emphasis added).
280 Kendall, supra note 280.
276
277
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issued patents.281 Since the 1980s, third-parties could challenge a European
patent within nine months of issuance through an opposition proceeding.282
With around 5% of all European patents challenged, opposition proceedings
have long been an important part of the patent system in Europe.283 And in
drafting the AIA, Congress emulated certain aspects of European oppositions,
including the nine-month “first window” to challenge patents.284
At first glance, PGRs appear very similar to EPO opposition proceedings.
Both are only available nine months after issuance, allow for written and oral
arguments, and provide an opportunity to amend the claims.285 A closer look,
however, reveals key differences between the U.S. and European approaches to
post-grant proceedings. For one, parties in Europe have stronger incentives to
file an opposition shortly after issuance.286 If a party forgoes opposition, the
only other avenue to challenge validity is through the national courts, which is a
process that is comparably more expensive and unpredictable.287 By contrast,
U.S. litigants can challenge issued patents more than nine months after issuance
through IPRs, and do not have to choose between centralized administrative
revocation and a patchwork of national court proceedings.288 Moreover, EPO
oppositions have no estoppel effect, and petitioners can still present the full
range of invalidity arguments in subsequent litigation.289 The result is that “first
window” validity challenges like oppositions proceedings are widely-used in
Europe, but rarely invoked in the U.S. 290
This section looks at administrative patent reviews in Europe, and compares
the role of the EPO to that of the PTO. It starts by providing a brief overview
of European opposition proceedings. This section then examines the possible
benefits of making some aspects of AIA Reviews more like European
oppositions. In particular, the PTO could conduct PGRs in a more
examinational manner, while focusing on the litigation replacement function of
IPR. For PGRs, this would mean narrowing the estoppel provisions and
281 David Lewin, EPO Oppositions Are Affordable, Powerful and Increasingly Important,
253 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 44, 49 (2015); Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1006.
282 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 99 [hereinafter
European Patent Convention].
283 Lewin, supra note 281, at 45; Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1006.
284 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 47–48 (2011).
285 Marsnik, supra note 239, at 189.
286 Leythem Wall & Hazel Ford, 7 Reasons Revocation in EU Could be As Popular as IPR
in U.S., LAW360 (Apr. 25, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/775865/7reasons-revocation-in-eu-could-be-as-popular-as-ipr-in-us.
287 Id.
288 35 U.S.C. § 282 (establishing invalidity as defense in district court infringement
proceedings); id. at 311 (allowing parties other than the patent owner to challenge validity
through IPR).
289 Lewin, supra note 281, at 47.
290 Id.; Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1003; see supra Part III.B.
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bolstering the Board’s ability to examine claims. IPR would retain broad estoppel
provisions, but otherwise mimic district court litigation more closely by giving
patents a presumption of validity and applying a narrower claim construction
standard. In principle, this should encourage petitioners to request PGR more
often, and allow PTO to take on a more examinational role for these “first
window” validity reviews.
A. POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS IN EUROPE

European opposition proceedings are administered by the EPO, an agency
created in part to harmonize patent law in Europe.291 Despite the existence of a
common market for goods and services, patent rights in Europe are still enforced
through national courts.292 This fragmented approach creates various problems.
Procuring patents in each state is cumbersome and adds significant costs to
obtaining patent rights across Europe.293 The lack of a single patent regime
makes patent enforcement and revocation more challenging because national
courts often have inconsistent standards and procedures.294 To address this
problem, various states adopted the European Patent Convention (EPC) to
provide for centralized examination and processing of European Patents
through the EPO.295 A European Patent, however, still needs to be validated in
each state’s national patent office before it will have legal effect in that state.296
This process remains expensive, with one estimate placing the cost for obtaining
enforceable patent rights in all countries subject to the European Patent
Convention at fifteen times the cost of obtaining a U.S. patent.297
The EPC also allows parties to request cancellation of a European Patent
through an centralized opposition proceeding at the EPO.298 Procedurally, any
person except the patentee may file a notice of opposition within nine months
of the notice of issuance.299 After the initial notice of opposition, the opposing
party remains part of the opposition proceedings and may be invited to file

291 Kevin P. Mahne, A Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court for the European Union: An Analysis
of Europe’s Long Standing Attempt to Create a Supranational Patent System, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 162, 173–74 (2012).
292 Id. at 167.
293 Gaurav Jit Singh, Unified European Front: The Road Towards a European Unitary Patent 5 (E.U.
Centre in Singapore, Working Paper No. 21, 2014), http://aei.pitt.edu/63494/1/WP21European-Unitary-Patent.pdf.
294 Mahne, supra note 291, at 168–69.
295 European Patent Convention, supra note 282, art. 99.
296 Mahne, supra note 291 at 167.
297 Id. at 168.
298 European Patent Convention, supra note 282, at art. 99.
299 Id.
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written responses to support invalidity.300 The opposing party can also argue at
an oral hearing.301 Once the EPO renders a decision, it becomes legally effective
in every country designated on the European patent.302
Compared with AIA Reviews, oppositions are far more examinational. As
the EPO has explained, oppositions are “not essentially contentious” and the
deciding body does not have to be neutral.303 For instance, the EPO “shall not
be restricted . . . to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties,”
and “shall examine the facts of its own motion.”304 Thus, rather than acting as
an unbiased adjudicator, the EPO procedures seem more focused on ensuring
that issued patents are not overly broad or otherwise invalid. 305 And consistent
with this role, the EPO generally does not allow parties to jointly terminate an
opposition proceeding through settlement.306 Once the EPO becomes aware of
potentially invalidating prior art, the agency can proceed independently to
invalidate the patent, even if the opposing party requests termination. 307
Moreover, opposition proceedings do not have any estoppel effect.308 Thus, the
opposing party remains free to raise invalidity defenses in subsequent litigation.
An unsuccessful opponent can “use the same facts, the same evidence, and the
same arguments that he used during the European opposition procedure in the
national procedure.”309
Consistent with its examinational policy goals, the EPO also applies fairly
liberal standards for claim amendments in opposition proceedings. Patentees
can simultaneously submit multiple sets of proposed amended claims.310 The
patentee typically files a main request, along with multiple auxiliary requests that
include narrower sets of proposed claims.311 Some patent owners will file more
than ten auxiliary requests to help ensure their patent survives review in some
amended form.312 The EPO considers each request individually, and will allow
Id. at art. 101.
Id. at art. 116.
302 Lewin, supra note 281, at 44–45.
303 Heli Pihlajamaa, Opposition and Appeal Proceedings at the European Patent Office,
European Patent Office, AIPLA at 3 (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/IP-Practice-inEurope/Committee%20Documents/AIPLAOppositionAppeal2210.pdf.
304 European Patent Convention, supra note 282, art. 114.
305 Id. art. 114(1); Pihlajamaa, supra note 303, at 3.
306 Marsnik, supra note 239, at 189–90.
307 Id.
308 De Corte et al., supra note 29, at 113.
309 Id.
310 Jennifer Turchyn, Improving Patent Quality Through Post-Grant Claim Amendments: A
Comparison of European Opposition Proceedings and U.S. Post-Grant Proceedings, 114 MICH. L. REV.
1497, 1512 (2016).
311 Id. at 1511-12.
312 Id. at 1512.
300
301
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the broadest claims requested in view of the cited prior art. 313 The statistics for
European opposition confirm that the EPO tends to allow more claim
amendments. Overall, about one third of all opposed patents are allowed in
some amended form.314
Once the nine-month period for opposition expires, however, a party seeking
to challenge a European Patent can only do so through the national courts. 315
Not only is mounting separate challenges through the national courts expensive,
but it can also result in inconsistent decisions between various courts regarding
the same invention.316 As such, there have been various attempts to create a
supranational patent court to handle both enforcement and revocation.317
Indeed, the EPC itself was meant to be one of several steps towards creating a
full European Community Patent enforceable across member states.318 After
years of extensive negotiations, however, national government opposition
ultimately scuttled plans for the European Community Patent.319
Despite these setbacks, the European Commission has renewed its effort to
create a supranational patent regime. In February 2013, twenty-five member
states signed an agreement to create a Unified Patent Court (UPC).320 When and
if the UPC goes into effect, it will serve as a single forum for patent enforcement
and revocation for the newly created Unitary Patent, which will have legal effect
across member states.321 In some respects, the UPC seems akin to U.S. district
courts because it decides both infringement and validity.322 But unlike district
courts, the UPC will be staffed in part by technically trained patent judges. 323
The UPC will also allow independent revocation actions, and permit the patentee
to amend its claims during such proceedings.324

Id.
Wall & Ford, supra note 286; Turchyn, supra note 310, at 1501.
315 Wall & Ford, supra note 286.
316 Id.
317 Mahne, supra note 291, at 169–80 (describing various attempts to create a supranational
patent court in Europe).
318 Singh, supra note 293, at 6–7; Mahne, supra note 291, at 175–76.
319 Paul Meller, Fresh Opposition to Europe Patent Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/24/business/worldbusiness/24patent.html.
320 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, 2013 O.J. (C 175) 1 [hereinafter UPC Agreement];
About the Unified Patent Court, UNIFIED PATENT COURT, https://www.unified-patentcourt.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
321 Mahne, supra note 291, at 183–88.
322 Unified Patent Court, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/lawpractice/unitary/upc.html#tab1 (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
323 UPC Agreement, supra note 323, arts. 8, 15.
324 PRELIMINARY SET OF PROVISIONS FOR THE RULES OF PROCEDURE (“RULES”) OF THE
UNIFIED PATENT COURT R. 30, 42 (18th draft, October 19, 2015), https://www.unified313
314
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With the framework for the UPC in place, some contend that “Europe is the
closest it has been since the mid-1970’s to establishing an EU-wide supranational
patent system.”325 Nevertheless, several hurdles still remain to making the UPC
a reality. The UPC agreement requires ratification by thirteen member states,
which must include the three countries with “the highest number of European
patents” in 2012.326 These are the U.K., Germany, and France.327 Despite its
decision to leave the European Union, the U.K. ultimately ratified the UPC
Agreement in April 2018.328 German ratification, however, has been put on hold
pending a constitutional challenge against UPC ratification in the German
Constitutional Court.329
B. LESSONS FROM OPPOSITION PROCEEDINGS

As a preliminary matter, it is important to acknowledge that EPO oppositions
are far from perfect. Oppositions are much slower than PGRs and IPRs. If the
appeal period is included, oppositions can take four to eight years to reach a final
determination.330 So even after a European Patent issues, patentees and
competitors can go for years without certainty as to whether the claims will
ultimately be upheld. This can be especially problematic for innovative products
with short life cycles, such as mobile devices or software.331 As one law firm
noted, “[d]elays of four to six years while the EPO decides whether a patent is
valid are not commercially viable” for some industries.332 Likewise, others
observe that competitors often use opposition proceedings to harass patent

patent-court.org/file/134/download?token=kBosxprv (hereinafter “Preliminary UPC
Procedural Rules”)
325 Mahne, supra note 291, at 183.
326 UPC Agreement, supra note 323, art. 89.
327 Benjamin Beck & Ulrich Worm, German Parliament Approves Ratification of the UPC
Agreement, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c2ba2b7c-d552-4fa9b694-11a15ce05246.
328 Olga Bezzubova et al., Two Down, One to Go: The UK Ratifies Unified Patent Court Agreement,
LEXOLOGY (May 1, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bc7c7618-ee6447cf-b458-5ce9bf01659a; Peter Hale, Does the UK Government’s Brexit plans bode well for the UPC?,
LEXOLOGY (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=811b30731ec2-467b-85bc-ac684dbb9402.
329 Joachim Fledges & Michael Krenz, UPC ratification process in Germany put on hold Following
Constitutional Complaint, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ff06e540-b288-4660-b809-07aa6521f899.
330 Radcliffe, supra note 31; Early Certainty at the EPO- Our Perspective, Kilburn & Strode LLP,
http://www.kilburnstrode.com/assets/articles%20&%20briefing%20notes/Early%20certai
nty%20-%20our%20perspective.pdf (last visited August, 29, 2018).
331 Early Certainty at the EPO, supra note 330.
332 Radcliffe, supra note 31.
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owners by filing a notice of opposition at the very end of the nine-month period,
which creates a longer period of uncertainty for patentees.333
Despite these drawbacks, opposition proceedings have been successful in at
least one respect, which is promoting a high number of challenges to patent
validity within nine months of issuance. Studies show that oppositions have a
“screening” effect that weeds out bad patents early and improves the overall
quality of European Patents.334 Within the past five years, around five percent
of all European Patents have been opposed.335 At first glance, reviewing five
percent of issued patents may not seem like it would have a meaningful impact
on overall patent quality. However, studies show that oppositions are more likely
to be directed against patents that are economically valuable and likely to be
litigated.336 Those patents also present the greatest risk of improperly tying up
important technologies and causing welfare loss if their scope is too broad. 337
Thus, opposition proceedings identify patents that are most likely to impact the
economy and subject those to additional scrutiny.338 So although only five
percent of issued patents are challenged, scholars have found that oppositions
have a comparably greater impact on overall patent quality in Europe.339
Compared with EPO oppositions, none of the various forms of
administrative patent review in the U.S. have been nearly as successful.340 In the
thirty-year period from 1981 to 2011, the PTO granted an average of around
120,000 patents annually.341 Yet the PTO received, on average, only around 380
requests for ex parte reexamination per year.342 Likewise, very few parties
333 Pernille W. Gojkovic & Claus Elmeros, Oppositions at the European Patent Office- A Cruel
Tool…, HØIBERG (June 2015), https://hoiberg.com/om-hoeiberg/artikler/oppositions-atthe-european-patent-office-a-cruel-tool/.
334 Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patent before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business
Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 611–15 (1999); Hall & Harhoff,
supra note 32, at 1002–07; Marsnik, supra note 239, at 187 (“Oppositions serve a positive
screening function of weeding out a substantial number of bad patents and narrowing a
substantial number that are too broad.”).
335 Lewin, supra note 281, at 45; Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1006.
336 Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1006; Marsnik, supra note 241, at 186–87.
337 Vishnubhakat, supra note 64, at 337; Lemley, supra note 62, at 6–8.
338 Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the America Invents
Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 117 (2011).
339 Merges, supra note 334, at 611–15; Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1002–07; Marsnik,
supra note 241, at 187.
340 Carrier, supra note 338, at 112–15.
341 U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/
ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated June 16, 2016).
342 Carrier, supra note 338, at 113; Farrell & Merges, supra note 209, at 966 (“The original
reexamination system has been at best a modest success. Although it is an imperfect measure,
it is striking that less than 1% of issued U.S. patents are ever challenged by a reexamination
request.”).
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requested inter partes reexamination, which was widely considered a failure.343
Nor are there any indications that PGRs will be used more frequently. By the
end of 2017, there have only been 86 petitions for PGRs.344 Although IPRs are
used more frequently, they are primarily used concurrently with litigation, which
does little to advance the policy goal of reducing the competition skewing effect
of invalid patents before they are litigated.345
Congress and the PTO could take several steps to create stronger incentives
for parties to file PGR petitions. As discussed above, EPO oppositions do not
have any estoppel effects on subsequent litigation.346 In theory, Congress could
follow suit and eliminate the estoppel provision for PGRs. Considering the
patent owner industry groups’ concerns about the use of post-grant proceedings
to harass patent owners, eliminating estoppel altogether for PGR may not be
politically feasible.347 A more realistic fix would be to narrow the estoppel
provision for PGRs to only the grounds actually raised in the petition. Indeed,
the legislative history of the AIA indicates that Congress never intended PGRs
to broadly preclude subsequent validity challenges.348 Rather, the PGR estoppel
provision seems to have been an unintentional import from the IPR statute. 349
By removing the phrase “reasonably could have raised” for PGR, Congress
would make clear that petitioners are only estopped from re-litigating the specific
grounds for invalidity raised in their petition. Thus, if an unsuccessful PGR
petitioner later discovers a written description problem or a new anticipatory
reference that it missed during the initial nine-month window, the petitioner
would not be foreclosed from mounting those invalidity defenses in litigation.
Although narrowing estoppel will inevitably raise fears of harassment, the
limited time window for filing PGR petitions should mitigate such concerns.
Even in its current form, the PGR estoppel provision does not prevent multiple
PGR petitions. PGRs take eighteen months to complete after the petition is
filed, so the nine-month window for PGR would close before the Board can
reach a final written decision.350 Instead, PGR estoppel only applies to
Report to Congress on Inter Partes Reexamination, USPTO,
https://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/Archives/General/US_PTO/Po41217R.pdf
(last
visited August, 29, 2018); Vishnubhakat, supra note 64, at 346.
344 2017 TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 3.
345 Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making, supra note 19, at 70 (“[V]alidity challenges in
the USPTO are, indeed, connected with the threat or fact of infringement litigation, for a large
majority of challenged patents are also asserted in court… Our data indicate that patents
challenged in the PTAB are, on average, also asserted at least three times in court.”).
346 De Corte et al., supra note 29, at 113.
347 Matal, supra note 58, at 616 (“In the case of inter partes review, many patent owners
objected to repealing could-have-raised estoppel, arguing that such a change would result in
‘duplicative administrative and judicial challenges.’”).
348 Id. at 617–18.
349 Id.; Kendall, supra note 278.
350 35 U.S.C. §§ 324, 326.
343
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subsequent IPRs, CBMs, or litigation. Each of those proceedings has their own
means of preventing repeat validity challenges by the same party.351 In other
words, even if PGRs had no estoppel effect at all, the petitioner would still have
only one subsequent bite at the apple before triggering some form of estoppel.
In fact, the PTO could even eliminate the possibility of “follow-on” petitions for
PGRs if it waits until the nine-month period expires before requesting a patent
owner preliminary response or issuing an institution decision. That way, by the
time the PTO issues an institution decision, the window for filing a PGR would
have already closed. Although this practice will delay the final written decision,
it would also prevent petitioners from filing “follow-on” petitions within the
PGR period.
Narrowing PGR estoppel is a necessary, but likely insufficient, step towards
shifting validity disputes earlier in the life of a patent. The more difficult question
is how to encourage parties to challenge patents soon after issuance, not just how
to remove disincentives. Opposition proceedings are popular in Europe in large
part because parties must resort to expensive and unpredictable national court
proceedings after the nine-month window closes.352 Of course, it is neither
feasible nor desirable to emulate this aspect of the European system.
Nevertheless, parties are more likely to challenge patents early if there are
disadvantages to delay. In fact, during the drafting of the AIA, one of the
arguments against a “life-of-the-patent” proceeding, like IPR, was that “if review
could be sought later when a defendant is sued, big businesses would lose the
incentive to challenge bad patents early in their life, and, as a result, ‘the public
will face the consequences of living with an invalid patent for years and
years.’ ”353
One solution might be to model PGRs after European opposition
proceedings, but make IPRs more similar to the proposed UPC revocation
procedures. In theory, the UPC should create a centralized enforcement and
revocation system in Europe, which means that parties will no longer have to
choose between opposition or separate challenges in national courts.
Nevertheless, there are still compelling reasons for parties to use oppositions

351 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315, 325. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 315.
Unlike IPRs and PGRs, CBMR estoppel only reaches the grounds that were actually raised,
and does not include grounds that “reasonably could have been raised.” Id.
352 Wall & Ford, supra note 287.
353 Matal, supra note 58, at 603 (quoting Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1908
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop., 110th Cong. 56 (2007)
(statement of Gary Griswold, President and Chief IP Counsel, 3M Innovative Properties Co.,
on behalf of the Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform)).
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instead of relying on UPC revocations.354 The UPC draft rules suggest that
revocation proceedings will be costlier and more adjudicative in nature.355 The
standard for amending claims at the UPC is likely to be far more stringent than
in EPO opposition proceedings. The draft rules only allow the patentee to
submit one application to amend the patent, and any subsequent requests to
amend can only be entered with leave of court.356 Further, the application to
amend must also explain “why the proposed amended claims are valid,”357 which
seems similar to the PTO’s pre-Aqua standard for claim amendment in AIA
Reviews.
The PTO could take a similar approach by applying adjudicative standards
for IPRs, including a presumption of validity and the district court claim
construction standard, while retaining the broader examinational standards for
PGRs. In principle, this would make patents harder to invalidate in IPR and
would push more parties to request PGR. Logically, it seems reasonable for the
Board and district courts to apply consistent standards for invalidity. Given that
over eighty percent of IPR and CBMR involved patents that are concurrently
litigated in court,358 IPRs might be better characterized as part of litigation than
a redo of patent examination. Raising the invalidity standards for IPRs also gives
patent owners greater certainty in their patent rights. As Justice Breyer noted in
Oil States, there is a concern that the current AIA regime allows challenges to
issued patents after patent owners have made significant investments in their
inventions.359 Although this also happens when district courts invalidate patents,
IPRs can be more problematic because of the lower burden of proof and broader
claim construction. Under Director Iancu, the PTO has already taken steps to
make IPRs more adjudicative by proposing to use the district court standard for
claim construction instead of the broadest reasonable interpretation.
If the PTO adopts district court standards for IPRs, this would provide a
stronger justification for a strict approach to motions to amend. As discussed in
Section III, the Board’s ability to independently examine claims is limited, so the
PTO initially placed the burden of proof for validity on patent owners to prevent
unexamined claims from issuing.360 However, recent experience shows how this
354 See, e.g., Thorstein Bausch, EPO Opposition vs. UPC Revocation at 47–48, EPLIT
Annual Meeting (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.eplit.eu/files/downloads/AGM%202016/
Bausch%20-%20EPO%20Opposition%20vs.%20UPC%20Nullity%20Action.pdf.
355 Unified Patent Court: Counterclaims for Revocation, Crowell & Moring LLP (Dec. 1,
2015), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/Unified-Patent-CourtCounterclaims-for-Revocation.
356 Preliminary UPC Procedural Rules, supra note 324, at R. 30.
357 Id.
358 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69; Sameni, supra note 184.
359 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-32, Oil States, No. 16-712 (U.S. argued Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16712_879d.pdf.
360 See supra Part III.A.2.
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practice can result in denial for the vast majority of motions to amend.361 This
is problematic because, as one critic of IPRs noted, “[t]he reality for Patent
Owners is that their opponents get the benefit of significantly lower standards
than in district court litigation, but Patent Owners do not get the corresponding
benefit of an ability to amend their claims in response to the unpatentability
assertions.”362 By making the standards for IPR more adjudicative and
consistent with district court litigation, opponents would no longer benefit from
broader claim construction or lower validity standards. Accordingly, the PTO
could maintain a strict standard for motions to amend without skewing IPR
proceedings in favor of petitioners.
V. CONCLUSION
The first five years of the America Invents Act (AIA) has revealed basic
disagreements about the function of post-grant proceedings, particularly with
respect to the institutional role of the PTO. Many contend that such proceedings
have essentially become an alternative for district court litigation with lower
standards for validity. This Article identified two aspects of AIA Reviews that
undercut their examinational function: the failure to incentivize early resolution
of patent validity and the PTO’s limited capacity to independently examine
claims in AIA Reviews.
EPO oppositions, however, demonstrate that post-grant proceedings can
have adjudicative procedures but still screen out dubious patents early. This is
partially attributable to the unique position of opposition proceedings in the
European patent system, since there are currently no alternatives for resolving
validity through a centralized proceeding. With the coming of the UPC, one
topic for future inquiry is whether parties continue to file oppositions at the same
rate even after UPC revocation proceedings become available. Indeed, some
have already suggested that parties may take a “watch and wait” approach to
challenging validity after the UPC.363 Regardless, EPO oppositions provide a
useful contrast to AIA Reviews, and offer guidance on how the PTO can use
administrative patent reviews to better protect the public from overbroad patents
and promote certainty in patent rights.

See supra Part III.A.2.
Lewis & Irving, supra note 20, at 65.
363 Stephanie Pilkington & Ling Zhuang, EPO opposition reforms: the changing face of central patent
revocation, LIFE SCI. INTELL. PROP. REV. (July 28, 2016), https:// www.lifesciencesipreview.com
/contributed-article/epo-opposition-reforms-the-changing-face-of-central-patentrevocation.
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